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| | Description | Fiasco, Thomas E. Ricks’s #1 New York Times bestseller, transformed the political dialogue on the war in Iraq—The Gamble is the next news breaking installment Thomas E. Ricks uses hundreds of hours of exclusive interviews with top officers in Iraq and extraordinary on-the-ground reportage to document the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 as only he can, examining the events that took place as the military was forced to reckon with itself, the surge was launched, and a very different war began. Since early 2007 a new military order has directed American strategy. Some top U.S. officials now in Iraq actually opposed the 2003 invasion, and almost all are severely critical of how the war was fought from then through 2006. At the core of the story is General David Petraeus, a military intellectual who has gathered around him an unprecedented number of officers with both combat experience and Ph.D.s. Underscoring his new and unorthodox approach, three of his key advisers are quirky foreigners—an Australian infantryman-turned- anthropologist, an antimilitary British woman who is an expert in the Middle East, and a Mennonite-educated Palestinian pacifist. The Gamble offers news-breaking account, revealing behind-the-scenes disagreements between top commanders. We learn that almost every single officer in the chain of command fought the surge. Many of Petraeus’s closest advisers went to Iraq extremely pessimistic, doubting that the surge would have any effect, and his own boss was so skeptical that he dispatched an admiral to Baghdad in the summer of 2007 to come up with a strategy to replace Petraeus’s. That same boss later flew to Iraq to try to talk Petraeus out of his planned congressional testimony. The Gamble examines the congressional hearings through the eyes of Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and their views of the questions posed by the 2008 presidential candidates. For Petraeus, prevailing in Iraq means extending the war. Thomas E. Ricks concludes that the war is likely to last another five to ten years—and that that outcome is a best case scenario. His stunning conclusion, stated in the last line of the book, is that “the events for which the Iraq war will be remembered by us and by the world have not yet happened.”
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| | Product Details | | Author: | Thomas E. Ricks | | Hardcover: | 400 pages | | Publisher: | Penguin Press HC, The | | Publication Date: | February 10, 2009 | | Language: | English | | ISBN: | 1594201978 | | Product Length: | 9.4 inches | | Product Width: | 1.5 inches | | Product Height: | 6.4 inches | | Product Weight: | 1.5 pounds | | Package Length: | 9.2 inches | | Package Width: | 6.4 inches | | Package Height: | 1.3 inches | | Package Weight: | 1.5 pounds | | Average Customer Rating: |  based on 64 reviews |
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| | Customer Reviews | Average Customer Review: ( 64 customer reviews )
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120 of 133 found the following review helpful:
 An Impressive, Well-Told Story! Feb 10, 2009
By Loyd E. Eskildson
"Pragmatist"
My 1960s experience within the Army and its conduct in Vietnam convinced me the entire organization was incompetent. Iraq II (until recently), "drive around until you were either shot or blown up," did not change that opinion. Fortunately, we now have Thomas Ricks' story ("The Gamble") of Generals Petraeus, Keane, Odiorne and others - their intelligence, initiative, and courage to speak out when things didn't go well.
Ricks documents the inside story of the Iraq war since late 2005. Despite all the happy talk, the ground situation was bad and getting worse. It was unclear what we were trying to do. The Bush administration continued to substitute loyalty for analysis, and so the war continued on a strategic foundation of sand.
General Casey tried to change the troops' poisonous attitude toward civilians when he arrived earlier in the year, establishing a special training center for his immediate officers. Yet, too often the military was needlessly humiliating Iraqi families, and destroying their property - hardly the way to win friends and undermine al Qaeda. Worse yet, Casey also withdrew the troops into big, isolated bases that reduced casualties but left the population defenseless. (Vietnam, all over again!)
Sensing General Petraeus might bring new solutions, Army leaders sent him to lead Ft. Leavenworth and its Command and General Staff College. There he initiated efforts to rewrite the Army manual on counterinsurgency, drawing not only upon respected thinkers within the ranks, but also civilian academics, a few reporters, and some with foreign insurgency experience.
The manual was finished in 11 months, largely written and heavily edited by Petraeus himself. Its focus moved from Powell's doctrine of "overwhelming force" to recognizing that the best insurgent is not a dead one, likely to leave behind a relative seeking revenge, but one who is ignored by the population and perhaps contemplating changing sides and bringing in valuable information.
Meanwhile, as 2007 neared, five forces for change converged upon the White House. 1)Retired General Keane first pressed Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman Pace for change - lacking success, he was referred to V.P. Cheney by former Speaker Gingrich. This led to a meeting with Bush. 2)American Enterprise Institute's Fred Kagan, similarly concerned, set up a 12/08/06 meeting with analysts, military planners, General Keane, and Col. H.R. McMaster (author of "Dereliction of Duty" and leader of a successful effort in Iraq's Tal Afar province. 3)The "thumping" the Bush administration took in the Nov. 2006 elections. 4)General Pace convened a group of respected colonels to obtain new thinking - Col. McMaster was one. 5)Gen. Odiorne, Iraq's second in command, went around his superior to the White House to push for more troops.
The first major change was removing the major impediment to change - Secretary Rumsfeld. Then General Petraeus' assignment to Iraq, "the surge," and implementation of the new manual. (The surge was opposed by almost all Army leaders, and Petraeus' new boss - Admiral Fallon.)
Now it's Obama's War, and Ricks sees the U.S. possibly continuing in a combat role until 2011 - others are more pessimistic. Why? Baghdad has been turned around, but problems remain in other large cities (eg. Kirkuk), Sadr is still jockeying for leadership, Iran would like to see the U.S. leave - slowly (sees U.S. troops as "hostages" to any attack U.S. attack on Iran), and Iraq's police and army are still largely suspect as Shiia sectarian "death squads."
New perspectives include no longer seeing civilians as the playing field, living with the populace - not just taking occasional trips to tour through, not taking relatives of suspected insurgents hostage, not abusing prisoners, being alert for signs of divisions within the insurgency and then encouraging them to change sides, no more "kiss of death" operations where Americans move into an area, find cooperative locals, then pull out and they're killed.
Final Note: General Petraeus and many of his advisers are PhDs from respected institutions. This has become a "thinking man's Army," no longer a refuge for those who couldn't succeed as civilians. Unfortunately, we are still left wondering why the White House had to be forced to "lead" these changes, and why "Blackwater," with its well-established record for blatant disregard and unwarranted violence against Iraqi civilians was allowed to continue operations by the State Dept.
49 of 52 found the following review helpful:
Rumsfeld vs Petraeus: Shock & Awe vs Military Diplomacy Feb 11, 2009
By The Spinozanator
"Spinozanator"
Pulitzer Prize winner Ricks comes to this book with over 20 years of experience in journalistic coverage of US military interventions. His access to key military figures is comparable to Woodward's access to the Bush White House. In this book he provides verbatim statements from key players as to how the war changed from a Rumsfeld war into a Petraeus war, with details about the new approach. What a difference in personnel and strategies! - Most of the brass under Petraeus would never have invaded Iraq in the first place. Instead of being hawks they are intellectuals - and it shows in their carefully considered methodology.
The story Ricks tells is compelling. Bush recognized his dilemma (despite his public optimism about the war) and lucked into the necessary fix through the expertise of Petraeus & company. Unfortunately, Ricks anticipates difficulties in exiting Iraq, predicting "the events for which the Iraq war will be remembered by us and by the world have not yet happened."
This is a comprehensive and definitive read and should be required reading for anyone who wants to know what went on - direct from the horses' mouths. It gives a whole new perspective on how future military entanglements will unfold. Shock and awe may have to share turf with military diplomacy - not such a bad idea.
38 of 41 found the following review helpful:
The quest for sustainable security Feb 11, 2009
By The Ginger Man
In Fiasco, Thomas Ricks told the story of American military involvement in Iraq through 2005. His new book is based on a series of interviews with General Petraeus and other military staff conducted in Baghdad and Washington concerning events from 2006-2008. Although the "Surge" is often characterized as an unqualified success, Ricks argues that the final grade for this part of the American adventure in Iraq is a "solid incomplete." He also suggests that the details of this military reformation and counterattack are, to date, barely known.
The author describes the transition under General Petraeus from traditional warfare to counterinsurgency which is "founded on the concept that the civilian population isn't the playing field but rather the prize." This change represented both an implicit criticism of past military practice in Iraq and "a major intellectual, cultural, and emotional shift" for American forces. Petraeus' unusual advisors in this effort include an Aussie counterinsurgency specialist, a British expert on the Mid-East who opposes the war and a "pacifistic Arab turned New Yorker."
In a brisk narrative, Ricks describes changes in strategy and tactics that aim at creating security for Iraqi civilians rather than racking up body counts of insurgents. Violence is reduced and confidence is built by the provisional government culminating in the Maliki led attack on Basra in March of 2008.
In the end, Ricks agrees that the most that can be achieved in Iraq is Petraeus' vision of "sustainable security." The best case scenario, he projects, is that "in the long run, Iraq would calm down, be mildly authoritarian, and probably become an ally of Iran, but, with luck, not one that threatened the rest of the Arab world." He argues that McCain's campaign rhetoric describing Iraq as a future beacon of democracy is at odds with the General's more realistic hope as well as with all we have learned in the last 5 years of partially successful nation building. Ricks goes as far as to describe McCain's view as verging on fantasy.
In sum, says the author, "the surge was the right step to take, or more precisely, the least wrong move in a misconceived war." The ultimate result of the Iraq war according to Ambassador Crocker is still very much in doubt and "is going to be a very, very long time in unfolding." Petraeus' efforts as recounted by Ricks were both bold and well-executed but their benign impact was circumscribed by the complex nature of the challenges facing Iraq.
Although a more detailed and nuanced analysis probably awaits us in the future, Ricks delivers a timely and convincing narrative of how an intellectual in the military used a non traditional approach to bring the US and Iraq back from the brink of disaster to the edge of "sustainable security."
11 of 11 found the following review helpful:
Excellent, Timely Book -- a Must Read Mar 14, 2009
By A. Courie
"Treb"
Thomas Ricks' "The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008" is an excellent, well-researched, and well-told account of how the now-vaunted surge turned around the Iraq War. Ricks had access to General Petraeus, General Odierno, many of their key staff, and used their insights - along with media and journal articles and unclassified after action reports - to tell his story.
Ricks' story is that the surge (adding significant additional combat forces to Iraq) concept wasn't the consensus plan of the military but was instead championed by a small group of officers and some academics in the defense establishment. It took the intervention of a retired Army four-star general to bypass Secretary Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to sell the surge to the White House. This contradicts some of the claims in Bob Woodward's "The War Within" that the idea of the surge was originally hatched in the White House.
But Ricks goes on to explain how the true genius of the surge wasn't the addition of additional combat troops, it was a change in tactics and outlook. The soldiers got out of their vehicles, patrolled dismounted, and lived among the Iraqis - they no longer "commuted" to the fight and then returned to their bases at night. (As an aside, I observed in 2004 on the ground in Iraq that the emphasis on force protection and unwillingness to take risks among the Iraqi people was damaging to the mission.) And once the soldiers cleared and occupied an area, they were to hold it. This change in tactics was partly the result of the new counterinsurgency manual produced by General Petraeus in late 2006, and it was enabled by the surge in combat troops. At the higher levels, the military engaged the Iraqi tribes and Sunni militias and co-opted them, often with payments and sometimes behind the back of the Iraqi and US governments, in an effort to eliminate, but not necessarily through firepower, enemies to the peace and security in Iraq.
And while Ricks lauds the success of the surge, he is quick to point out its weaknesses and risks: although it brought relative peace and security to Iraq (after an initial increase in fighting), it did not move the political process forward. The surge also, by appealing to the tribes and militias, made it more likely that they'll remain powerful extra-political forces in Iraq even as the political process moves forward.
Because this book was written so soon after the incidents, and is based heavily on media accounts, it will serve as a good first draft of history. It is also not the definitive history of the surge because it gives the view from the top in Iraq, then tiny slices of the war on the ground, and never gives a full accounting of the brigades and divisions involved or their areas of operation.
But my biggest criticism is that many of the Ricks's conclusions are already out of date: he claims that we are at the mid-point of the Iraq War and expects tens of thousands of troops to remain in Iraq through 2015 or even later. However, his narrative includes events in November 2008, just a month before the Status of Forces Agreement was signed requiring all US forces out of Iraq by the end of 2011 - a provision of the agreement that was being debated openly before November 2008. Ricks also knew about Obama's promises to have all troops out of Iraq within 16 months but never really addressed this possible chain of events (clarified by President Obama's recent announcement to remove all combat troops by August 2010 and the remained out by the end of 2011). While it is certainly difficult to release a book during a time of rapid change in the subject, holding publication of the book a couple of key months would have allowed him to address these issues.
This is an extremely informative and engaging book. Ricks takes up where he left off with "Fiasco," shows that the American military can adapt and overcome, and highlights the personalities who made this happen. He does this in an even-handed manner that highlights the success of the surge but points out its weaknesses. Anyone with any interest in current events, the war in Iraq, or the military should read this book for a much fuller understanding of the Iraq War.
7 of 7 found the following review helpful:
War in the Time of "the Surge" Mar 19, 2009
By Nicholas E. Sarantakes
Thomas E. Ricks is a Pulitzer Prize winner and it shows in this book. Ricks has written an impressively even handed account that examines the war in Iraq during the time of "the surge." Ricks shows that the military, the U.S. Army in particular, learned from its mistakes, which he documented fully in his previous book, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005. In particular, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, one of the generals that emerged in Fiasco as being most responsible for things going wrong in Iraq, is one of the key figures in salvaging the situation. It is a testimony to the professionalism of Ricks as a reporter that he is willing to offer such a different portrait of the man.
Despite what most think, "the surge" was about more than just an increase in troop numbers. It was a time when the military (the Army and the U.S. Marine Corps) adopted a new approach to the conflict. New measures like aggressive patrolling, small unit deployment among the Iraqis, and the development of intelligence networks designed to neutralize rather than kill the insurgent took the place of big units hunkered down on well-fortified and distant bases that responded to incidents with intense and indiscriminate firepower. General David Petraeus played a key role in developing this change when, as the commandant of the Command & General Staff College, he pushed through the development of a new field manual for counter-insurgency warfare. This subject was close to his heart, since he had written a Ph.D. dissertation at Princeton on the lessons of Vietnam. Petraeus, however, was smart enough to realize he needed other smart people to help once he took over in Iraq. Ricks offers portraits of an interesting cast of characters, which if nothing else shows that Petraeus really was willing to think outside of the box. In fact, he goes as far as to say that Odierno was more responsible than Petraeus for developing the new strategy and doctrine the accompanied "the surge."
Ricks spent twenty-five years as a defense correspondent for _The Wall Street Journal_ and _The Washington Post_, and he uses that background to good advantage. The book is well-written and an exceptionally easy read. He examines every level of war, ranging from grunts in firefights at the tactical level, to high-level discussions at the Pentagon. He shows an appreciative understanding for the Sergeants and First Lieutenants that are on the front lines. He also shows a better understanding for events than many of his colleagues. In particular, he puts the famous walk Petraeus took through the Baghdad markets with Senator John McCain into its proper context. While many reporters saw the heavy security apparatus protecting the two men and dismissed it as a publicity stunt, Ricks notes that what was most significant was that the market was in business because it was well-protected, which had not been the case earlier. The only shortcoming in this account is that he includes little discussion of events that transpired at the White House where he appears to have few contacts.
Rick's previous book "Fiasco" is required reading at several military schools where I have taught. I have no doubt that the same will be true for "The Gamble."
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